To quite the contrary, the thread itself serves as the base, as do the many debates that you and I have had. All one must do is go look.

Bushido,

Perhaps we can have a more engaging and fruitful dialogue than this thread has seemed to produce otherwise. If you would could you further explain for me what you mean by "know(ing) the context of another's knowledge"?

There is no denying the representational and practical value... I agree.

Heya Bushi... ah, sometimes I learn stuff, other times not.

When speaking, stating what one believes.

What if they believe what they're saying? Is that a lie?

Doesn't a lie require that the teller not believe what they're saying?

Necessity and contingency are modality terms. Contrary to what has been claimed thus far, in philosophy there is more than one use/meaning. Regarding math being real...

That depends entirely upon what you mean by "real".

I sort of agree with heavenlyboy in a way. You show me a number, and I'll show you a person counting. Quantities are real, numbers are nothing more than names for quantities.

So, because the German Jews breathed they are somehow responsible for the state of Germany during the third reich?

I cannot continue this utterly ridiculous conversation.

To each their own, I suppose.

I know what you said. Your argument treats loyalty to one's home country as though it ought be the number one priority for loyalty. I disagree, and have given good reason why I do. I've yet to see good reason given for your assertions otherwise.

You're just plain wrong prashant01. Everyone is not necessarily responsible for what happens in their home country. You're wrongfully presupposing that everyone has an influence regarding that.

And so then we base our conclusions upon what exactly?

I would agree that not all things considered wrong would be correctly called evil as well. I don't understand the rest. I mean, are you saying that one cannot do evil unless they possess the knowledge of what doing evil is?

Rather than continuing with the story and attempting to conclude that God "tricked" them, why not just reject the entire thing based upon the incoherence that you've set out?

Something's odd here MsHarmony.

I would like to see the differences between good and right, and evil and wrong better explained. I mean, what can possibly be considered "good" if it is not also moral(right) as well? What could possibly be considered "evil" if it is not also bad(immoral).

So what is the difference between evil/wrong and good/right?

This strikes me as dubious. I mean, if that is true, then it would only follow that all the folk who left Germany during the rise and reign of the third reich are somehow responsible for what was happening in their "motherland" and that they've conveniently forgotten that responsibility. I would think that if those folk had any say in the matter, then things would've turned out much differently. You're saying that all citizens of every "motherland" are equally responsible for the way a country turns out. I strongly disagree. To quite the contrary, it seems to me that you're not taking into consideration the fact that not all citizens have a say in how their "motherland" is governed. IOW, you're presupposing all "motherlands" are democratic in tradition. India is. The US is. Not all countries are.

There are many nations where the citizens do not have much say in what is happening in the government. In such countries, one can grow tired and weary of the actions of that government without ever having the ability to directly and legally influence the way things are to any significant degree. Goverment can change a country to the point where some citizens are no longer happy with or proud of the country to which they belong. One leader can do that much. In such cases, I would say that there is nothing wrong with NOT loving one's "motherland". I mean, why should a German-Jew love his "motherland" if s/he were born in 1925 and lived in Berlin until Hitler came into power and beyond?

Drawing the distinction between justified belief and knowledge...

I have sufficient reason to believe that the sun will rise in the morrow. I'm justified in holding that belief. The possibility, however remote, still exists that my belief about the events of tomorrow will turn out false. That and that alone does not deny the idea that I know that the sun will rise tomorrow. Rather, what denies that the status of being knowledge is that it is not true.

Knowledge must be true. If it were not necessary for knowledge to be true, then we would be able to say, without problem, that we STILL know that the world is flat.

This claim is false.

A belief and/or statement is false regardless of whether it has been falsified. Falsification requires knowledge to the contrary. Being false does not. There is an important distinction which need drawn between being false and being falsified.

I've already said what needed to be said regarding the inherent weakness of basing belief upon lack of evidence to the contrary. My counter-arguments stand without comment.





Let us think carefully about what is being claimed here.

There is no good reason whatsoever for us to say now that the earth was flat then. That is nonsense. Folk believed then that the earth was flat. They used things as evidence to support that view. They believed that the earth was flat. It was not.

They were mistaken.

I strongly reject your conclusion above. They did not know that the earth was flat. Rather, they believed that it was. They did not have knowledge, they had justified false belief. "The earth is flat" cannot be known because the earth is not flat.





Another bad sign. This is neither what I've claimed, nor something that I would.





I say that there is no such thing as "knowledge which is perfectly matching reality". I can be swayed though.

Can you give an example of this "true knowledge"?





This is confused. I observe what I believe to be an air balloon.





Predictions are not knowledge, they are belief about what may come.

On my view, thought/belief and/or statements about reality are true, false, and/or neither. Your prediction was neither because it had yet to have happened. The above was my response to your knowledge claim that the sun would rise the following day. The problem is that that was not a bit of knowledge, because it had not yet happened. It was justified belief, for the aforementioned reasons.

This is becoming rather incoherent(self-contradictory). I mean, the cogito has problems in and of itself, but rather than argue against it, I'll grant the argument. The aforementioned problem of incoherency is revealed by our knowing something(anything). Knowing of the existence of ourselves is knowing something.

I claimed that "we can know nothing" is nonsense. I stand by that claim. For reasons already given, any argument which logically leads to such a conclusion ought be given further due attention, because something is wrong somewhere. True premisses cannot validly lead to false conclusions, and "we can know nothing" is false. It is impossible for it to be true, for if it were true it would falsify itself.




You're conflating knowledge of self and knowledge of the existence of oneself. They are not the same bit of knowledge. Knowledge of self is socially influenced; how one identifies themself and is strongly affected by personal value assessment/attribution. Whereas knowledge of one's existence requires no personal value assessment/attribution.

We know that we are susceptible to error. It does not follow that we cannot acquire and/or possess justified true belief.

I know that this is a hand, and here is yet another. These are called "hands".

Not a good sign. Here's what I'm arguing regarding that...

There are numerous claims that cannot be falsified due to the nature of the claim. The flying spaghetti monster comes immediately to mind. With such cases, it only follows that there can be no evidence to the contrary. Thus, lack of evidence to the contrary is insufficient reason for assent. If that were not the case, we would all believe all unfalsifiable claims. We do not.

I meant what I wrote and not what you implied I ought to have meant. I know what "necessary conditions" means.





I simply claimed that a lack of evidence to the contrary is insufficient for belief. I stand by that claim.

Well, all doubt is removed by pointing at the thing. If we were speaking in person, I would point at one who has red hair and say something like "That is red hair"----->




I disagree. "Red hair" is the name for that----->





I would agree that red hair is not knowledge, but that's not what I'm claiming. Red hair is a thing. Knowing what "red hair" is does constitute being a bit of knowledge. I know what "red hair" is because I know that they are words in the English language used to denote that----->

I know what red hair is because I how to use the words "red hair" correctly as a means for denoting that----> Red hair is the thing that "red hair" denotes.

Are you denying that?




This is patently false. It contradicts everyday fact, as it occurs. A pre-linguistic child can - and does - learn that touching fire causes pain without ever uttering the statement "touching fire causes pain". So, it is clear that something can be known without being expressed as a statement. It subsequently follows that statements are not the only things which are truth-apt.

Are you willing to deny that tt is the case that a prelinguistic child can know that touching fire causes pain without language, and thus without expressing what is known with a statement? I'm not.

In order for you and I to talk about it must be expressed with language(statements), but that's another matter altogether and it doesn't serve us to conflate them.




You've already claimed this, and I've already addressed it. There are two significant problems here...

1."It does not have predictive value" does not follow from what was written, so this looks like an odd use of "therefore".

2.The claim that knowledge must have predictive value has already been refuted. It doesn't matter whether or not "X" has predictive value, because not all knowledge does. There are numerous examples to the contrary, because fact/reality clearly shows us otherwise.


Here's what you're arguing...

p1. Knowledge must have predictive value
p2. "I know what red hair is" does not have predictive value
C. "I know what red hair is" is not knowledge

That is a perfectly logical/valid argument. However, validity is insufficient for truth. Logic presupposes truth. False premisses cannot validly lead to true conclusions, and vice-versa. That being said...

"Knowledge must have a predictive value" is presupposed within your premisses(definitions). I'm saying that that premiss/definition is clearly false. The argument rests upon a dubious presuppositon. I've already given a simple counter-example, which you've claimed does not have predictive value, and I would agree. That was exactly the point being made. It is justified true belief(knowledge). It has no predictive value. Therefore, not all knowledge has predictive value.

So, we're forced to make a decision here. Either we admit that I have acquired and possess knowledge of what red hair is, or we deny that I know what red hair is.

The latter is inconceivable. I mean, claiming that it is not a bit of knowledge simply because it does not have predictive value doesn't pass the muster test, as has been shown now with two completely different examples either of which adequately deny that claim. If we conclude that I do not know what red hair is based upon the absence of predictive value, then we must also conclude that I do not know what a tree is, what a book is, what a computer is, what a hand is, etc. Knowing the names of things, has no predictive value. There can also be no written predictive value without first knowing the names of things.

Thus, it makes much more sense to me to say that I know what red hair is. That bit of knowledge, in and of itself, has no predictive value. However, it is a true statement about the way things are, and I believe that statement. I can, and have, justified that statement as well.



I refuted the idea that knowledge has predictive value by showing a bit which has none. Not all knowledge has predictive value.