Iraq war illegal, says Annan




Watch Kofi Annan
The United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has told the BBC the US-led invasion of Iraq was an illegal act that contravened the UN charter.
He said the decision to take action in Iraq should have been made by the Security Council, not unilaterally.

The UK government responded by saying the attorney-general made the "legal basis... clear at the time".

Mr Annan also warned security in Iraq must considerably improve if credible elections are to be held in January.

The UN chief said in an interview with the BBC World Service that "painful lessons" had been learnt since the war in Iraq.

"Lessons for the US, the UN and other member states. I think in the end everybody's concluded it's best to work together with our allies and through the UN," he said.

'Valid'

"I hope we do not see another Iraq-type operation for a long time - without UN approval and much broader support from the international community," he added.

He said he believed there should have been a second UN resolution following Iraq's failure to comply over weapons inspections.

And it should have been up to the Security Council to approve or determine the consequences, he added.

When pressed on whether he viewed the invasion of Iraq as illegal, he said: "Yes, if you wish. I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal."

You can not have credible elections if the security conditions continue as they are now

Kofi Annan


Annan interview excerpts
UK Colonel accuses Allies

Mr Annan's comments provoked angry suggestions from a former Bush administration aide that they were timed to influence the US November election.

"I think it is outrageous for the Secretary-General, who ultimately works for the member states, to try and supplant his judgement for the judgement of the member states," Randy Scheunemann, a former advisor to US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told the BBC.

"To do this 51 days before an American election reeks of political interference."

A UK foreign office spokeswoman said: "The Attorney-General made the government's position on the legal basis for the use of military force in Iraq clear at the time".

Australian Prime Minister John Howard also rejected Mr Annan's remarks, saying the legal advice he was given was "entirely valid".

The BBC's Susannah Price at UN headquarters in New York says Mr Annan has made similar comments before.

He has said from the beginning the invasion did not conform with the UN charter - phrasing that was seen as a diplomatic way of saying the war was illegal.

Our correspondent says Mr Annan's relationship with the US might be made a little uncomfortable for a while following his comments, but both sides are likely to want to play it down.

US President George W Bush is due to speak at the UN General Assembly next week.


Iraq elections

Mr Annan also said in the interview the UN would give advice and assistance in the run-up to the elections, but it was up to the Iraqi interim government to decide whether such a vote should go ahead.

He warned there could not be "credible elections if the security conditions continue as they are now".

The UK foreign office spokeswoman said there was a full commitment to hold elections in January.

Election and political party laws had already been passed and an independent electoral commission established.

"The task is huge and the deadline tight, but the Iraqi people clearly want elections," she said.

On Wednesday, the head of the British army General Sir Mike Jackson said national elections in Iraq were still on track.

On Monday, Iraq's interim Prime Minister Iyad Allawi said elections must go ahead as planned although he conceded the violence might stop some Iraqis voting.


However, a day later a car bomb close to an Iraqi police station in central Baghdad killed 47 people and gunmen opened fire on a police minibus in Baquba, killing 12.





E-mail this to a friend Printable version

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm

ok for those with the short memory

iraq invaded kuwate

international force went in

upon ceasefire agreement

iraq agreed to unrestricted inspections for weapons

iraq failed to keep this agreement

thus the reinvasion of iraq for breaking

the ceasefire agreement

and now we are at today

the invasion of iraq was legal

as they did not keep the agreement

of unrestricted inspections

Here is the listing of all cases since 2000 in the International Court of Justice which is the only court with jurisdiction over the matter.....if there any formal and legitimate allegation that the war was illegal it would be listed here....








and here's a list of pending cases...nothing here either..

could you list the link please

RAF doctor refused to fight 'illegal' Iraq war

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Change font size: A | A | ABy Kim Sengupta
Wednesday, 12 April 2006


An RAF doctor on trial for refusing to serve in Iraq told a court martial yesterday that he refused to go because the war was against "international law, the Nuremberg principles and the rules of armed conflict".


Flight Lieutenant Malcolm Kendall-Smith, the first member of the armed forces to be charged with disobeying orders to deploy in Iraq, said he had come to his decision after researching the legal advice given to Tony Blair by the Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith.

The officer, who has dual British and New Zealand nationality, told the hearing that he had "two great loves in my life, medicine and the Royal Air Force. To take the decision that I have saddens me greatly but I feel that I have no other choice."

Flt Lt Kendall-Smith, 37, has been charged with five counts of disobeying lawful commands in 2005 when he was asked to deploy to Basra inIraq. There are no set time limits on any prison sentence he may face if convicted.

The officer, who held a post as a tutor in moral philosophy at a New Zealand university, had previously served in Oman, Kuwait and Qatar in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. After studying the arguments for and against the invasion he declared that he did not want to be complicit in an illegal war and tried to resign from the RAF. Giving evidence at the opening day of the court martial at Aldershot barracks in Hampshire, Flt Lt Kendall-Smith said: "The illegality of the use of force against Iraq was the only reason I could not follow this order."

Asked by his counsel, Philip Sapsford QC, why he had not taken the usual course of shortening his RAF contract and insisted on resigning, he said he could not sign the appropriate form as he had decided that "I would, in fact, refuse the orders as a duty under international law, the Nuremberg principles and the law of armed conflict".

At an earlier pre-trial hearing Assistant Judge Advocate Jack Bayliss had ruled that the doctor could not use the defence that he acted according to his conscience in refusing military orders. The judge maintained that the US and British forces were now there on the invitation of the Iraqi government.

During yesterday's hearing Judge Advocate Bayliss clashed repeatedly with the defendant and his counsel. At one point when Flt Lt Kendall-Smith began to refer to copious notes in front of him on the witness box about the legal standing of the war, the judge snapped: "I will not allow diatribes on international law. It is already clear in your evidence that you believe the war is illegal."

Later the judge stated: "I will not let this court be used as a grandstand." Flt Lt Kendall-Smith replied: "I am not grandstanding. It's in the context of the presentation of my position in my case to outline misconceptions put before this court ... if I am unable to speak how can I put my position to the court?" Judge Advocate Bayliss said: "I am not prepared to be argued with by a witness defendant in my court."

David Parry, opening the case for the prosecution, told the court martial that Flt Lt Kendall-Smith had applied for early release from the RAF a month prior to his refusal to go to Iraq.

"The background to this case appears to be a sense of grievance felt by the defendant, first that he couldn't immediately resign from the RAF, and secondly that he remained eligible for deployment overseas," he said.

Flt Lt Kendall-Smith vehemently denied in the witness box that his decision to leave the RAF was influenced by any other factor than serving in Iraq. He claimed that he had already been verbally notified of the deployment, triggering his decision to resign.

The hearing continues.

His words

As a commissioned officer I am required to consider... every order that is given to me and I am required to consider the legality of each order... Since my initial operational deployments, I have studied... the commentaries and... notes, including one prepared by the Attorney General and in particular the note to the Prime Minister dated 7 March 2003.

I believe the occupation of Iraq is illegal... and for me to comply... would put me in conflict with both domestic and international law. The illegality of the use of force against Iraq was the only reason I could not follow this order... [and] was the only reason for my resignation.

I would, in fact, refuse the orders as a duty under international law, the Nuremburg principles and the law of armed conflict...

To take the decision I have taken saddens me but I feel I have no choice.

I was subjected, as was the entire population, to propaganda depicting force against Iraq to be lawful but it was not until the middle of 2004 that I researched and found that not to be the case.

Could Bush Be Prosecuted for War Crimes?

By Jan Frel, AlterNet. Posted July 10, 2006.



A Nuremberg chief prosecutor says there is a case for trying Bush for the 'supreme crime against humanity, an illegal war of aggression against a sovereign nation.' Tools

The extent to which American exceptionalism is embedded in the national psyche is awesome to behold.

While the United States is a country like any other, its citizens no more special than any others on the planet, Americans still react with surprise at the suggestion that their country could be held responsible for something as heinous as a war crime.

From the massacre of more than 100,000 people in the Philippines to the first nuclear attack ever at Hiroshima to the unprovoked invasion of Baghdad, U.S.-sponsored violence doesn't feel as wrong and worthy of prosecution in internationally sanctioned criminal courts as the gory, bload-soaked atrocities of Congo, Darfur, Rwanda, and most certainly not the Nazis -- most certainly not. Howard Zinn recently described this as our "inability to think outside the boundaries of nationalism. We are penned in by the arrogant idea that this country is the center of the universe, exceptionally virtuous, admirable, superior."

Most Americans firmly believe there is nothing the United States or its political leadership could possibly do that could equate to the crimes of Hitler's Third Reich. The Nazis are our "gold standard of evil," as author John Dolan once put it.

But the truth is that we can, and we have -- most recently and significantly in Iraq. Perhaps no person on the planet is better equipped to identify and describe our crimes in Iraq than Benjamin Ferencz, a former chief prosecutor of the Nuremberg Trials who successfully convicted 22 Nazi officers for their work in orchestrating death squads that killed more than one million people in the famous Einsatzgruppen Case. Ferencz, now 87, has gone on to become a founding father of the basis behind international law regarding war crimes, and his essays and legal work drawing from the Nuremberg trials and later the commission that established the International Criminal Court remain a lasting influence in that realm.

Ferencz's biggest contribution to the war crimes field is his assertion that an unprovoked or "aggressive" war is the highest crime against mankind. It was the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 that made possible the horrors of Abu Ghraib, the destruction of Fallouja and Ramadi, the tens of thousands of Iraqi deaths, civilian massacres like Haditha, and on and on. Ferencz believes that a "prima facie case can be made that the United States is guilty of the supreme crime against humanity, that being an illegal war of aggression against a sovereign nation."

Interviewed from his home in New York, Ferencz laid out a simple summary of the case:

"The United Nations charter has a provision which was agreed to by the United States formulated by the United States in fact, after World War II. Its says that from now on, no nation can use armed force without the permission of the U.N. Security Council. They can use force in connection with self-defense, but a country can't use force in anticipation of self-defense. Regarding Iraq, the last Security Council resolution essentially said, 'Look, send the weapons inspectors out to Iraq, have them come back and tell us what they've found -- then we'll figure out what we're going to do. The U.S. was impatient, and decided to invade Iraq -- which was all pre-arranged of course. So, the United States went to war, in violation of the charter."

It's that simple. Ferencz called the invasion a "clear breach of law," and dismissed the Bush administration's legal defense that previous U.N. Security Council resolutions dating back to the first Gulf War justified an invasion in 2003. Ferencz notes that the first Bush president believed that the United States didn't have a U.N. mandate to go into Iraq and take out Saddam Hussein; that authorization was simply to eject Hussein from Kuwait. Ferencz asked, "So how do we get authorization more than a decade later to finish the job? The arguments made to defend this are not persuasive."

Writing for the United Kingdom's Guardian, shortly before the 2003 invasion, international law expert Mark Littman echoed Ferencz: "The threatened war against Iraq will be a breach of the United Nations Charter and hence of international law unless it is authorized by a new and unambiguous resolution of the Security Council. The Charter is clear. No such war is permitted unless it is in self-defense or authorized by the Security Council."

Challenges to the legality of this war can also be found at the ground level. First Lt. Ehren Watada, the first U.S. commissioned officer to refuse to serve in Iraq, cites the rules of the U.N. Charter as a principle reason for his dissent.

Ferencz isn't using the invasion of Iraq as a convenient prop to exercise his longstanding American hatred: he has a decades-old paper trail of calls for every suspect of war crimes to be brought to international justice. When the United States captured Saddam Hussein in December 2003, Ferencz wrote that Hussein's offenses included "the supreme international crime of aggression, to a wide variety of crimes against humanity, and a long list of atrocities condemned by both international and national laws."

Ferencz isn't the first to make the suggestion that the United States has committed state-sponsored war crimes against another nation -- not only have leading war critics made this argument, but so had legal experts in the British government before the 2003 invasion. In a short essay in 2005, Ferencz lays out the inner deliberations of British and American officials as the preparations for the war were made:


U.K. military leaders had been calling for clear assurances that the war was legal under international law. They were very mindful that the treaty creating a new International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague had entered into force on July 1, 2002, with full support of the British government. Gen. Sir Mike Jackson, chief of the defense staff, was quoted as saying "I spent a good deal of time recently in the Balkans making sure Milosevic was put behind bars. I have no intention of ending up in the next cell to him in The Hague."

Ferencz quotes the British deputy legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry who, in the lead-up to the invasion, quit abruptly and wrote in her resignation letter: "I regret that I cannot agree that it is lawful to use force against Iraq without a second Security Council resolution … [A]n unlawful use of force on such a scale amounts to the crime of aggression; nor can I agree with such action in circumstances that are so detrimental to the international order and the rule of law."

While the United Kingdom is a signatory of the ICC, and therefore under jurisdiction of that court, the United States is not, thanks to a Republican majority in Congress that has "attacks on America's sovereignty" and "manipulation by the United Nations" in its pantheon of knee-jerk neuroses. Ferencz concedes that even though Britain and its leadership could be prosecuted, the international legal climate isn't at a place where justice is blind enough to try it -- or as Ferencz put it, humanity isn't yet "civilized enough to prevent this type of illegal behavior." And Ferencz said that while he believes the United States is guilty of war crimes, "the international community is not sufficiently organized to prosecute such a case. … There is no court at the moment that is competent to try that crime."

As Ferencz said, the world is still a long way away from establishing norms that put all nations under the rule of law, but the battle to do so is a worthy one: "There's no such thing as a war without atrocities, but war-making is the biggest atrocity of all."

The suggestion that the Bush administration's conduct in the "war on terror" amounts to a string of war crimes and human rights abuses is gaining credence in even the most ossified establishment circles of Washington. Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinion in the recent Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ruling by the Supreme Court suggests that Bush's attempt to ignore the Geneva Conventions in his approved treatment of terror suspects may leave him open to prosecution for war crimes. As Sidney Blumenthal points out, the Court rejected Bush's attempt to ignore Common Article 3, which bans "cruel treatment and torture [and] outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment."

And since Congress enacted the Geneva Conventions, making them the law of the United States, any violations that Bush or any other American commits "are considered 'war crimes' punishable as federal offenses," as Justice Kennedy wrote.

George W. Bush in the dock facing a charge of war crimes? That's well beyond the scope of possibility … or is it?

oh that one about the doc ....

almost two years old but no charges yet huh?....

That is not true. The inspections were not completed by the UN inspectors.

Blix: Iraq War Was Illegal
Blair's defense is bogus, says the former UN weapons inspector

by Anne Penketh in Stockholm and Andrew Grice

The former chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix has declared that the war in Iraq was illegal, dealing another devastating blow to Tony Blair.

Mr Blix, speaking to The Independent, said the Attorney General's legal advice to the Government on the eve of war, giving cover for military action by the US and Britain, had no lawful justification. He said it would have required a second United Nations resolution explicitly authorizing the use of force for the invasion of Iraq last March to have been legal.


Former UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix. (AFP/File/Sven Nackstrand)

His intervention goes to the heart of the current controversy over Lord Goldsmith's advice, and comes as the Prime Minister begins his fightback with a speech on Iraq today.


An unrepentant Mr Blair will refuse to apologize for the war in Iraq, insisting the world is a better place without Saddam Hussein in power. He will point to the wider benefits of the Iraq conflict, citing Libya's decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction, but warn that the world cannot turn a blind eye to the continuing threat from WMD.

But, in an exclusive interview, Mr Blix said: "I don't buy the argument the war was legalized by the Iraqi violation of earlier resolutions."

And it appeared yesterday that the Government shared that view until the eve of war, when it received the Lord Goldsmith's final advice.

Sir Andrew Turnbull, the Cabinet Secretary, revealed that the Government had assumed, until the eve of war in Iraq, that it needed a specific UN mandate to authorize military action.

Mr Blix demolished the argument advanced by Lord Goldsmith three days before the war began, which stated that resolution 1441 authorized the use of force because it revived earlier UN resolutions passed after the 1991 ceasefire.

Mr Blix said that while it was possible to argue that Iraq had breached the ceasefire by violating UN resolutions adopted since 1991, the "ownership" of the resolutions rested with the entire 15-member Security Council and not with individual states. "It's the Security Council that is party to the ceasefire, not the UK and US individually, and therefore it is the council that has ownership of the ceasefire, in my interpretation."

He said to challenge that interpretation would set a dangerous precedent. "Any individual member could take a view - the Russians could take one view, the Chinese could take another, they could be at war with each other, theoretically," Mr Blix said.

The Attorney General's opinion has come under fresh scrutiny since the collapse of the trial against the GCHQ whistleblower Katharine Gun last week, prompting calls for his full advice to be made public.

Mr Blix, who is an international lawyer by training, said: "I would suspect there is a more skeptical view than those two A4 pages," in a reference to Clare Short's contemptuous description of the 358-word summary.

It emerged on Wednesday that a Foreign Office memo, sent to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee on the same day that Lord Goldsmith's summary was published, made clear that there was no "automaticity" in resolution 1441 to justify war.

Asked whether, in his view, a second resolution authorizing force should have been adopted, Mr Blix replied: "Oh yes."

In the interview, ahead of the publication next week of his book Disarming Iraq: The search for weapons of mass destruction, Mr Blix dismissed the suggestion that Mr Blair should resign or apologize over the failure to find any WMD in Iraq.

But he suggested that the Prime Minister may have been fatally wounded by his loss of credibility, and that voters would deliver their verdict. "Some people say Bush and Blair should be put before a tribunal and I say that you have the punishment in the political field here," he said. "Their credibility has been affected by this: Bush too lost some credibility."

He repeated accusations the US and British governments were "hyped" intelligence and lacking critical thinking. "They used exclamation marks instead of question marks."

"I have some understanding for that. Politicians have to simplify to explain, they also have to act in this world before they have 100 per cent evidence. But I think they went further."

"But I never said they had acted in bad faith," he added. "Perhaps it was worse that they acted out of good faith."

The threat allegedly posed by Saddam's WMD was the prime reason cited by the British government for going to war. But not a single item of banned weaponry has been found in the 11 months that have followed the declared end of hostilities.

Mr Blair will argue that similar decisive action will need to be taken in future to combat the threat of rogue states and terrorists obtaining WMD.

© 2004 Independent Digital (UK) Ltd

###

and the results of Blix's opinion on the war??...can you say zilch?....

oh wait....I think he sold more books....but other than that...zilch....

http://www.whatreallyhappened.com/iraqwar.html
The Iraq War is Illegal

Below is the Congressional authorization for force that Bush used to launch the invasion of Iraq. However, if you read Section 3, paragraph B, Bush was required to prove to the Congress that Iraq was in violation of UN Resolutions by still being in possession of weapons of mass destruction, and secondly, that Iraq was behind 9-11. Both claims have since been disproved and discredited, and appear to be created by the Pentagon Office at the heart of the latest Israeli spy scandal.

Therefore, under United States law, the war in Iraq is illegal. And We The People are not under any legal or moral obligation to pay for it, let alone let our kids be killed in it.

If anything, Bush and his pro-war Neocon buddies should be required to reimburse the treasury for their private use of government property. I leave the question of civil lawsuits for wrongful deaths to the families of the dead American service people, and the live service people still suffering from depleted uranium.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by House)

HJ 114 EH

107th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. J. RES. 114

JOINT RESOLUTION

To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.

Whereas in 1990 in response to Iraq's war of aggression against and illegal occupation of Kuwait, the United States forged a coalition of nations to liberate Kuwait and its people in order to defend the national security of the United States and enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions relating to Iraq;

Whereas after the liberation of Kuwait in 1991, Iraq entered into a United Nations sponsored cease-fire agreement pursuant to which Iraq unequivocally agreed, among other things, to eliminate its nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs and the means to deliver and develop them, and to end its support for international terrorism;

Whereas the efforts of international weapons inspectors, United States intelligence agencies, and Iraqi defectors led to the discovery that Iraq had large stockpiles of chemical weapons and a large scale biological weapons program, and that Iraq had an advanced nuclear weapons development program that was much closer to producing a nuclear weapon than intelligence reporting had previously indicated;

Whereas Iraq, in direct and flagrant violation of the cease-fire, attempted to thwart the efforts of weapons inspectors to identify and destroy Iraq's weapons of mass destruction stockpiles and development capabilities, which finally resulted in the withdrawal of inspectors from Iraq on October 31, 1998;

Whereas in Public Law 105-235 (August 14, 1998), Congress concluded that Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs threatened vital United States interests and international peace and security, declared Iraq to be in `material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations' and urged the President `to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the United States, to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations';

Whereas Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations;

Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolution of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, including an American serviceman, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait;

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people;

Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council;

Whereas members of al Qaida, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq;

Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens;

Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001, underscored the gravity of the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist organizations;

Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify action by the United States to defend itself;

Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) authorizes the use of all necessary means to enforce United Nations Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions and to compel Iraq to cease certain activities that threaten international peace and security, including the development of weapons of mass destruction and refusal or obstruction of United Nations weapons inspections in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), repression of its civilian population in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 (1991), and threatening its neighbors or United Nations operations in Iraq in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949 (1994);

Whereas in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1), Congress has authorized the President `to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolution 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677';

Whereas in December 1991, Congress expressed its sense that it `supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization of Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1),' that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and `constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region,' and that Congress, `supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of United Nations Security Council Resolution 688';

Whereas the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338) expressed the sense of Congress that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime;

Whereas on September 12, 2002, President Bush committed the United States to `work with the United Nations Security Council to meet our common challenge' posed by Iraq and to `work for the necessary resolutions,' while also making clear that `the Security Council resolutions will be enforced, and the just demands of peace and security will be met, or action will be unavoidable';

Whereas the United States is determined to prosecute the war on terrorism and Iraq's ongoing support for international terrorist groups combined with its development of weapons of mass destruction in direct violation of its obligations under the 1991 cease-fire and other United Nations Security Council resolutions make clear that it is in the national security interests of the United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be enforced, including through the use of force if necessary;

Whereas Congress has taken steps to pursue vigorously the war on terrorism through the provision of authorities and funding requested by the President to take the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President and Congress are determined to continue to take all appropriate actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such persons or organizations;

Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and

Whereas it is in the national security interests of the United States to restore international peace and security to the Persian Gulf region: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the `Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002'.
SEC. 2. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.

The Congress of the United States supports the efforts by the President to--

(1) strictly enforce through the United Nations Security Council all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq and encourages him in those efforts; and

(2) obtain prompt and decisive action by the Security Council to ensure that Iraq abandons its strategy of delay, evasion and noncompliance and promptly and strictly complies with all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
SEC. 3. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) AUTHORIZATION- The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to--

(1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and

(2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.

(b) PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION- In connection with the exercise of the authority granted in subsection (a) to use force the President shall, prior to such exercise or as soon thereafter as may be feasible, but no later than 48 hours after exercising such authority, make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that--

(1) reliance by the United States on further diplomatic or other peaceful means alone either (A) will not adequately protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq or (B) is not likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq; and

(2) acting pursuant to this joint resolution is consistent with the United States and other countries continuing to take the necessary actions against international terrorist and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.

(c) War Powers Resolution Requirements-

(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION- Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Nothing in this joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
SEC. 4. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

(a) REPORTS- The President shall, at least once every 60 days, submit to the Congress a report on matters relevant to this joint resolution, including actions taken pursuant to the exercise of authority granted in section 3 and the status of planning for efforts that are expected to be required after such actions are completed, including those actions described in section 7 of the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-338).

(b) SINGLE CONSOLIDATED REPORT- To the extent that the submission of any report described in subsection (a) coincides with the submission of any other report on matters relevant to this joint resolution otherwise required to be submitted to Congress pursuant to the reporting requirements of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93-148), all such reports may be submitted as a single consolidated report to the Congress.

(c) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION- To the extent that the information required by section 3 of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) is included in the report required by this section, such report shall be considered as meeting the requirements of section 3 of such resolution.

Passed the House of Representatives October 10, 2002.

Attest:

Clerk.

107th CONGRESS

2d Session

H. J. RES. 114

JOINT RESOLUTION

To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq.


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See also: Iraq: The Words of Mass Deception


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What Really Happened

I think invading other countries and assassinations of their leaders, and over throwing govts, are things that should not be taken lightly, and I think our country is guilty of things like this , and I hear that there is no statute of limitations on murder. Time to put Washington dc (district of criminals)on trial. I think there is a whole nest of vipers and offspring of vipers in there. Start with the white house and Congress. Things could never get this bad unless our Congress was bribed and blackmailed., Yes, put the bush GANG on trial for murder, treason, war crimes and fraud. When I say bush gang <I think that includes the clintons also, I think they are one and the same bunch. I don't think they represent WE THE PEOPLE!!!

except in the real world where it really counts....

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Iraq: A Chronology of UN Inspections

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2000

An IAEA team returns to Iraq in January but only to conduct a regular inspection at a declared Iraqi nuclear site. As a state-party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iraq is obliged to allow IAEA inspectors to visit declared sites at least every 14 months. The IAEA makes clear, however, that the limited inspections under the NPT are no substitute for its intrusive inspections in years past and that it cannot give assurances that Baghdad is not covertly seeking nuclear weapons.

The Security Council remains divided throughout the year on relaxing sanctions. Despite disagreements among Security Council members about the new inspection regime, Hans Blix, who previously served as head of the IAEA, is named to run UNMOVIC following a contentious appointment process. The council approves a UNMOVIC work plan, but no UNMOVIC inspector sets foot inside Iraq, which still opposes the return of weapons inspectors.

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but no UNMOVIC inspector sets foot inside Iraq, which still opposes the return of weapons inspectors.

what is in that last line of

2000http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_10/iraqspecialoct02.asp



kinda hard to do when they oppose them being done

and if you recall Saddam was still interfering and playing with the inspectors while the US was built up on the border. Had the US not been there the inspectors would have gotten even less completed

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The United Nations' top two weapons experts said Sunday that the invasion of Iraq a year ago was not justified by the evidence in hand at the time.

"I think it's clear that in March, when the invasion took place, the evidence that had been brought forward was rapidly falling apart," Hans Blix, who oversaw the agency's investigation into whether Iraq had chemical and biological weapons, said on CNN's "Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer."

Blix described the evidence Secretary of State Colin Powell presented to the U.N. Security Council in February 2003 as "shaky," and said he related his opinion to U.S. officials, including national security adviser Condoleezza Rice.

"I think they chose to ignore us," Blix said.

http://www.cnn.com/2004/US/03/21/iraq.weapons/

for some reason the link did not work so here is the article

i found it by typing un inspections of iraq

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Iraq: A Chronology of UN Inspections
And an Assessment of Their Accomplishments, 1990-2002
An ACA Special Report

In April 1991, as part of the permanent cease-fire agreement ending the Persian Gulf War, the UN Security Council ordered Iraq to eliminate under international supervision its biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs, as well as its ballistic missiles with ranges greater than 150 kilometers. The Security Council declared that the comprehensive economic sanctions imposed in 1990 on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait would remain in place until Baghdad had fully complied with its weapons requirements.

Baghdad agreed to these conditions but for eight years deceived, obstructed, and threatened international inspectors sent to dismantle and verify the destruction of its banned programs. This systematic Iraqi effort to conceal and obscure the true extent of its weapons of mass destruction programs began almost immediately, when Baghdad lied about the status of its programs in its initial declarations and obstructed an inspection team. Iraq continued to harass, hinder, and frustrate inspectors until late 1998, when the inspectors withdrew from Iraq just hours before the United States and the United Kingdom launched three days of military strikes against Iraq for its noncooperation. Since that time, Iraq has permitted only limited inspections of declared nuclear sites but has not yet allowed the return of intrusive inspections to verify that it has lived up to its commitment to get rid of its prohibited weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs.

The inspectors’ job was hampered not only by Iraq but also by key countries on the Security Council whose support for the inspections waned. As time passed, the combination of unending confrontations between weapons inspectors and Iraqi officials; the reported growing humanitarian toll of sanctions on Iraqi civilians; and the economic costs of forgoing exports, imports, and energy deals with a former trading partner, undermined the willingness of China, France, Russia, and others from enforcing the inspections and sanctions regimes against Iraq. Quarrels erupted between these countries, which were sympathetic to Iraq and claimed that it had sufficiently disarmed, and the United States and the United Kingdom, both of which repeatedly contended Baghdad had not fulfilled the obligations laid out in the cease-fire agreement.

Shortly after leaving Iraq in 1998, weapons inspectors of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM), which was tasked with overseeing the destruction of Iraq’s chemical, biological, and missile programs, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), responsible for uncovering and dismantling the Iraqi nuclear weapons program, described their work as unfinished. The IAEA made much more progress than UNSCOM, but both sets of inspectors left Iraq with unanswered questions about Baghdad’s proscribed weapons.

UNSCOM reported numerous discrepancies, particularly with regard to biological weapons, between what Iraq claimed it had and evidence discovered by weapons inspectors. For four years, Baghdad denied the very existence of its biological weapons program. When Iraq finally did acknowledge having such a program, UNSCOM officials judged its declarations so insufficient—an assessment shared by independent experts—that the UN team claimed it could not even form a baseline by which to measure its progress in revealing and abolishing Iraq’s germ warfare program. More headway was made in the chemical weapons and missile areas, but by 1998 UNSCOM contended that key issues remained unresolved. For example, Iraq had failed to account for thousands of chemical warheads that it claimed, without any proof, to have used, lost, or unilaterally destroyed.

Iraq also sought to mislead the IAEA, but IAEA inspectors were largely successful in obtaining a relatively complete picture of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program and dismantling it. The IAEA, which removed from Iraq all known fissile material that could be used to make weapons, reported in February 1999 that there were no indications that meaningful amounts of weapon-usable material remained in the country or that it possessed the physical capability to produce significant amounts of such material indigenously. But the IAEA cautioned that because nuclear weapons material or infrastructure could be hidden, it could not verify with absolute certainty that Iraq had no prohibited materials.

A UN panel of experts tasked in 1999 with reporting on the results of the UNSCOM and IAEA efforts concluded that “the bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes has been eliminated,” but the experts emphasized that important issues remained unresolved. They further warned that, if weapons inspectors were kept outside Iraq, the risk that Iraq might reconstitute its programs would grow, and the initial assessments from which inspectors had been working would be jeopardized. The experts said the status quo was unacceptable, and they called for re-establishing an inspection regime in Iraq that was “effective, rigorous and credible.”

Following is a year-by-year summary of major events in Iraq and an assessment of what arms inspectors accomplished and what remains undone in Iraq.
A Chronology of UN Inspections


Pre-Persian Gulf War

Despite signing treaties forbidding the development or use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons, Iraq initiates programs to acquire such weapons. Iraq repeatedly violates the international norm against using chemical weapons during its eight-year war with Iran, which began with Iraq’s invasion of Iran in September 1980. Iraq also uses chemical weapons against some of its own villages, most notably against Halabja in a March 16, 1988, attack that kills an estimated 5,000 people. In addition to its chemical weapons program, Iraq is also suspected by some countries of pursuing nuclear weapons, prompting Israel in June 1981 to bomb and destroy Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear research reactor, which it acquired from France. The attack reportedly leads Iraq to intensify its illegal effort to acquire nuclear weapons.

1990

On August 2, Iraq invades Kuwait and is immediately condemned by the UN Security Council. The Security Council calls for Iraqi forces to withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait and imposes an arms embargo and economic sanctions that cut off all trade with Iraq except for the import of foodstuffs in humanitarian circumstances and items with medical purposes. Within a week of the invasion, the United States begins deploying military forces to Saudi Arabia. Iraq continues to defy UN demands to withdraw its forces from Kuwait, and on November 29 the Security Council approves Resolution 678, authorizing countries to use “all necessary means” to force Iraqi compliance if its troops do not return to Iraq by January 15, 1991.

1991

The January 15 deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait passes without action by Baghdad. A U.S.-led coalition initiates an air offensive January 17 against Iraq and its forces in Kuwait, followed by a ground attack on February 24 that drives Iraqi forces out of Kuwait within four days. A cease-fire is declared February 28.

On April 3, the Security Council adopts Resolution 687, mandating that Iraq eliminate all of its biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons programs as well as all of its ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than 150 kilometers. The resolution requires that the United Nations establish a special commission, UNSCOM, to verify that Iraq’s biological, chemical, and proscribed missile programs are eliminated, and the IAEA is charged with doing the same for Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Pledging to review the situation every 60 days, the Security Council declares that the sanctions imposed on Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait will remain in effect until the country complies with its disarmament obligations.

Iraq accepts the terms of this resolution three days later and provides initial declarations on the extent of its proscribed programs April 18, although it will revise all the declarations several times when confronted with evidence discovered by inspectors disproving its claims. UNSCOM later finds that Iraqi officials initially decided to report only their least modern weapons and to keep indigenous production capabilities and documentation secret so they could resume the programs.

Weapons inspections under the direction of Hans Blix, director-general of the IAEA, and Rolf Ekeus, executive chairman of UNSCOM, start in May and June and almost immediately face Iraqi obstructionism. Iraq is caught moving prohibited items away from inspection sites and denies access to other facilities. The Security Council responds August 15 with Resolution 707, the first of many resolutions condemning Iraqi noncooperation with weapons inspectors. In addition to describing Iraq as being in “material breach” of its commitments, the resolution further demands that Baghdad provide inspectors with “immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access” and supply new “full, final and complete disclosure” of all its weapons programs subject to elimination.

Iraq ignores the demands, and in September it temporarily blocks UNSCOM’s use of helicopters in the inspection process. A four-day standoff also ensues over the Iraqi confiscation of documents seized by inspectors, which are returned only after the Security Council threatens military action. The next month, the Security Council passes Resolution 715 demanding again that Iraq unconditionally carry out its obligations and “cooperate fully” with weapons inspections. This resolution also formally approves IAEA and UNSCOM plans for ongoing monitoring and verification to determine that once Iraq disarms, it does not reconstitute its weapons programs. Baghdad rejects the plans and does not accept them until November 1993.

Despite Iraq’s concerted efforts to thwart weapons inspectors, they succeed in starting destruction activities, and the IAEA begins shipping Iraq’s weapons-usable material out of the country.

1992

Weapons inspections and destruction activities continue without Iraq’s full cooperation, leading the Security Council in February to charge Iraq again with being in material breach of its obligations. This is the first of three such statements during the year. Iraq subsequently admits to having had more ballistic missiles and chemical weapons than it had previously acknowledged but claims that it unilaterally destroyed most of these items—a violation of the requirement that the destruction process be supervised by independent inspectors. Weapons inspectors later determine that Iraq unilaterally destroyed weapons to make it more difficult for inspectors to establish a comprehensive picture of its arms programs.

While actively obstructing inspectors, Baghdad seeks to preserve a veneer of compliance between May and June by submitting separate “full, final and complete disclosures” on its relevant weapons programs. Each declaration is subsequently found to be incomplete, particularly the biological weapons disclosure, in which Baghdad claims to have had only a “defensive” program. Iraq will eventually revise all disclosures several times.

Iraq refuses for three weeks in July to allow weapons inspectors inside the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture, which is suspected of housing documents detailing Iraq’s ballistic missile programs. A deal is eventually brokered allowing inspectors into the building, but no British, French, or U.S. inspectors are permitted to participate in the inspection, creating what some consider a bad precedent that allows Iraq to dictate the composition of inspection teams. During the standoff, the United States threatens to use force to gain entry, but the Security Council does not, revealing growing differences among Security Council members about enforcing Iraq’s disarmament.

Weapons inspectors make additional headway during the year, destroying key nuclear facilities, as well as chemical weapons and related production capabilities. The year, however, concludes with Iraqi officials verbally threatening the lives of the weapons inspectors.

1993

At the beginning of the year, Iraq refuses to allow UNSCOM aircraft to fly into the country, an action the Security Council deems a material breach and threatens might result in “serious consequences” for Baghdad. Iraq also steps up military activities along the Kuwaiti border and in the two no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq that the United States and its allies imposed on Iraq after the Persian Gulf War.

U.S.-led coalition forces carry out air strikes against Iraqi air defenses, radar and communication facilities, and nuclear-related sites in January, prompting Baghdad to temper its military activities and rescind its decision to block UNSCOM aircraft. Iraq soon resumes its belligerent behavior, however, aiming anti-aircraft weapons at UN helicopters and then initially rejecting inspectors’ efforts in June to install monitoring cameras at missile launch sites.

Also in June, the United States launches a limited cruise missile attack against Iraq in response to an alleged plot to assassinate former President George H. W. Bush.

Near the end of the year, Iraq permits the monitoring cameras to be installed and makes additional conciliatory steps, naming previous foreign suppliers of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and formally agreeing to the IAEA and UNSCOM monitoring and verification plans originally approved in October 1991 by the Security Council.

1994

In February, the IAEA ships Iraq’s last quantities of highly enriched uranium, which can be used to produce nuclear weapons, to Russia. The first half of the year is marked by relative cooperation from Iraq and statements of progress by weapons inspectors. But in September, Iraq sets an October 10 deadline for sanctions to be lifted, warns that it will cease cooperation with weapons inspectors if the Security Council does not drop sanctions, and moves its military forces toward Kuwait. The Security Council deems Iraq’s ultimatum unacceptable and approves Resolution 949, demanding that all Iraqi forces return to their original positions and that Iraq fully cooperate with UNSCOM. Iraq withdraws its forces, and weapons inspections continue.

1995

Under increasing pressure from some countries, particularly China, France, and Russia, to ease the sanctions imposed on Iraq to address worsening humanitarian problems in the country, the Security Council on April 14 unanimously approves the so-called oil-for-food program, which permits Iraq to sell up to $1 billion of oil every 90 days to buy food, medicine, and other civilian goods. The revenue from the sale of oil is kept in an escrow account controlled by the United Nations to prevent Iraq from purchasing items with potential military uses. Despite its significant economic hardship Iraq does not embrace the plan for more than a year, accepting it only in November 1996.

Confronted by evidence uncovered by weapons inspectors, Iraq admits for the first time on July 1 that it had an offensive biological weapons research and development program, but it denies having ever produced actual weapons. That same month, Baghdad issues another ultimatum, saying that it will end all cooperation with weapons inspectors if sanctions are not lifted by the close of August.

Iraq changes its tack, however, after the August 8 defection of Hussein Kamel, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law, who directed Iraq’s illicit weapons programs. In the following weeks, Iraqi officials take inspectors to Kamel’s farm, revealing hundreds of thousands of pages of documents that detail Iraqi weapons efforts. Iraq claims Kamel was pursuing the weapons on his own initiative. Kamel returns to Iraq months later and is killed.

Through a combination of Iraqi declarations and analysis of the recovered documents, weapons inspectors learn that Iraq had weaponized biological agents, had a more advanced indigenous ballistic missile program than previously believed, had produced more chemical weapons than disclosed earlier, and had initiated a crash program in 1990 to try to acquire a nuclear weapon in less than a year. In addition, an ongoing covert Iraqi operation to obtain banned missile gyroscopes is exposed in November.

1996

In March, Iraq delays weapons inspectors’ visits to five different sites, drawing condemnation from the Security Council. Three months later, Iraq again denies weapons inspectors access to sites they want to inspect. The Security Council responds June 12 by passing Resolution 1060, which demands yet again that Iraq provide inspectors unhindered access but which stops short of authorizing or threatening the use of force to support the inspectors. Iraq blocks another inspection the following day, leading the Security Council to criticize Iraqi cooperation again, even though some Security Council members are beginning to voice reservations about what they consider UNSCOM’s confrontational tactics.

UNSCOM Executive Chairman Rolf Ekeus travels to Baghdad June 19-22 to work out how inspections of “sensitive” Iraqi sites will be conducted, but within weeks Iraq prevents weapons inspectors from searching several such sites. The Security Council again tells Iraq in August that it is violating its obligations. Before the year closes, Iraq rejects efforts by weapons inspectors to remove remnants of destroyed missiles for outside, independent analysis, resulting in yet more Security Council criticism of Iraq’s behavior.

1997

After a three-month standoff, Iraq allows UNSCOM to remove destroyed missile parts from the country for outside analysis in March. The following month, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright asserts that the United States opposes automatically lifting the sanctions on Iraq once it has been disarmed of its weapons of mass destruction. She clearly implies that the United States will work to keep sanctions in place until Saddam Hussein no longer rules Iraq, effectively removing the only inducement for Iraqi cooperation with weapons inspections. Albright’s declaration contradicts Resolution 687, which states that the sanctions will be reviewed every 60 days and lifted once Iraq disarms.

Baghdad soon steps up its obstructionist activities. Iraqi officials in June jeopardize the safety of weapons inspectors by grabbing at the controls of UNSCOM helicopters while they are airborne, and Iraq blocks access to several sites. The Security Council responds June 21 by adopting Resolution 1115, which condemns Iraqi actions. In order to punish Iraq, the resolution also suspends the council’s usual 60-day review of sanctions. Australian Ambassador Richard Butler becomes UNSCOM executive chairman July 1, replacing Swedish Ambassador Rolf Ekeus.

Another round of Iraqi noncooperation begins in September, highlighted by Iraq barring weapons inspections at locations it describes as “presidential sites.” The Security Council responds October 23 with Resolution 1134, which again demands that Iraq cooperate with weapons inspectors, but the message sent is significantly weakened by the fact that five Security Council members—most notably China, France, and Russia—abstain from the vote.

Days later, Iraq, perhaps bolstered by the evident rift in the Security Council, announces it will not deal at all with U.S. weapons inspectors, orders them to leave the country, and then blocks inspection teams including US inspectors. UNSCOM and the IAEA withdraw most of their inspectors in response, and the Security Council calls on Iraq November 12 to rescind its decision and refrain from imposing any conditions on inspectors.

The United States builds up its military forces in the region and threatens action, but its aggressive stance is not backed by the Security Council. Averting a possible US attack, Russia negotiates the return of all inspectors to Iraq November 20. In spite of its pledge to cooperate with inspectors, Baghdad informs UNSCOM in mid-December that the so-called “presidential sites” are still off-limits to inspections. The Security Council replies that Iraq’s declaration is unacceptable.

1998

Iraq continues to block inspections at the eight locations it labels as presidential sites and refuses another inspection elsewhere, charging that too many US and British inspectors are on the team. In February, as Iraq stands firm on barring visits to presidential sites and a U.S.-led military buildup continues in the region, both the United States and Britain release reports detailing what weapons and equipment they believe Iraq is still hiding. With the prospect of renewed hostilities looming, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan travels to Iraq and reaches an agreement February 23, which reiterates that weapons inspectors are to have unfettered access in Iraq but which also spells out special procedures for inspecting presidential sites. At the end of the same month, Security Council members agree to increase the amount of oil Iraq can export to a little more than $5.2 billion every six months.

Inspectors visit the presidential sites in March and April without incident, and the Security Council issues a May statement expressing satisfaction with Iraq’s recent cooperation. Some Security Council members want to officially declare Iraq disarmed of its nuclear weapons and relax IAEA inspections, but the United States and Britain resist, claiming there are still unanswered questions. At the same time, UNSCOM holds that there has been little recent progress in resolving outstanding issues in the biological, chemical, and missile areas.

To Iraq’s dissatisfaction—as well as to that of its supporters on the Security Council—the IAEA reports at the end of July that it cannot close Iraq’s nuclear file, and on July 29 the council rejects a Russian proposal to stop investigating Iraq’s nuclear program. A few days later, UNSCOM Executive Chairman Richard Butler tells a top Iraqi official that UNSCOM’s inspections also need to continue.

On August 5, Iraq announces that it is suspending cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA inspections. The Security Council condemns Iraq’s decision the next day and one month later passes Resolution 1194, calling for Iraq to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. The resolution does not brandish a stick but a carrot, holding out the possibility of a comprehensive review of Iraq’s disarmament progress—a condition Iraq had long demanded—after it readmitted inspectors. On October 30, the Security Council approves a plan to conduct the review, but Baghdad declares the next day that in addition to not allowing inspections, it would no longer permit UNSCOM and IAEA activities to conduct less intrusive monitoring activities intended to determine Iraq’s continued compliance with its disarmament obligations. The Security Council condemns the move November 5 amid US and British preparations to punish Iraq with military strikes.

With a U.S.-British attack imminent, Iraq announces November 14 that it will cooperate with inspectors. Baghdad’s cooperation is short-lived, however, and the IAEA and UNSCOM withdraw their personnel from Iraq December 16, just hours before the United States and the United Kingdom begin three days of air strikes, during which Baghdad declares that weapons inspections are finished. The attacks surprise other Security Council members, some of whom condemn the action.

1999

Amid news reports and allegations that the United States used UNSCOM weapons inspections to collect intelligence for its own purposes, the Security Council authorizes a review of UN policy toward Iraq, including the status of Iraq’s disarmament. The panel charged with assessing Iraq’s disarmament reports at the end of March that “the bulk of Iraq’s proscribed weapons programmes has been eliminated,” but it also notes that “important elements still have to be resolved.” The panel acknowledges that reaching absolute certainty that Iraq has completely disarmed is unattainable and recommends focusing on resolving a few key outstanding issues. To achieve this objective, the panel calls for a reinforced monitoring and verification system that should, “if anything,” be more intrusive than the previous system. The panel also cautions that the longer weapons inspectors are kept out of Iraq, the greater the risk that Iraq might reconstitute its programs.

Months of debate ensue among Security Council members over how to resolve the Iraq situation. While the United States and the United Kingdom insist that Iraq fully disarm before sanctions are relaxed, China, France, and Russia contend that Iraq has already fulfilled the bulk of its disarmament commitments and that sanctions should be eased to induce Iraq to complete its final obligations. For its part, Iraq insists that sanctions must be lifted before inspectors can return.

The Security Council passes Resolution 1284 on December 17, creating a successor to UNSCOM—the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). China, France, and Russia abstain from the vote, revealing that divisions between Security Council members on Iraq still exist. The resolution erases the limit on the amount of oil Iraq can sell under the oil-for-food program and holds out the possibility that sanctions could be suspended for 120-day increments if Iraq cooperates with the new UN team, which is to be given unconditional and unrestricted access. The resolution also demands that within 60 days of their entry into Iraq, UNMOVIC and the IAEA draw up a list of key remaining disarmament tasks so that Iraq knows exactly what it must do to comply fully. Iraq rejects Resolution 1284.

2000

An IAEA team returns to Iraq in January but only to conduct a regular inspection at a declared Iraqi nuclear site. As a state-party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iraq is obliged to allow IAEA inspectors to visit declared sites at least every 14 months. The IAEA makes clear, however, that the limited inspections under the NPT are no substitute for its intrusive inspections in years past and that it cannot give assurances that Baghdad is not covertly seeking nuclear weapons.

The Security Council remains divided throughout the year on relaxing sanctions. Despite disagreements among Security Council members about the new inspection regime, Hans Blix, who previously served as head of the IAEA, is named to run UNMOVIC following a contentious appointment process. The council approves a UNMOVIC work plan, but no UNMOVIC inspector sets foot inside Iraq, which still opposes the return of weapons inspectors.

2001

Seeking to bolster the Iraq sanctions regime, which has been weakened as countries and companies illegally buy oil from Iraq and export prohibited goods to the country, the United States and the United Kingdom suggest overhauling the sanctions to focus more on military and dual-use goods and less on civilian trade. The aim of the “smart sanctions” is to help insulate the sanctions regime from the charges that it has caused widespread humanitarian suffering in Iraq. Other Security Council members, however, are skeptical and favor a more general easing or elimination of sanctions.

A heated debate lasts until November 29 when all Security Council members approve Resolution 1382, which establishes a Goods Review List that is subsequently adopted in May 2002. The list includes items with potential military use that must receive UN approval before Iraq can import them; civilian goods are exempted. Under the new sanctions, UNMOVIC and the IAEA will review all proposed contracts with Iraq to search for items included on the Goods Review List. According to the plan, items not on the list with no military application will be approved, while items on the list will go to the sanctions committee for further review. Items that would likely be used for military purposes will be denied.

2002

In his January State of the Union address, President George W. Bush labels Iraq a member of an “axis of evil,” along with Iran and North Korea. The president’s speech is the first of many statements by top US officials on the dangers posed by Iraq, many of which question the ultimate worth of arms inspections and advocate the overthrow of Saddam Hussein as the only way to guarantee that Iraq will not develop weapons of mass destruction in the future.

Less than two months after Bush’s speech, Iraqi officials meet with Secretary-general Annan and UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Blix to discuss arms inspections for the first time since 1998. UN officials fail to win the return of inspectors at this meeting or two subsequent ones that occur in May and July.

On September 12, amid increasing speculation that the United States is preparing to invade Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein, President Bush delivers a speech to the United Nations calling on the organization to enforce its resolutions for disarming Iraq. Bush strongly implies that if the United Nations does not act, the United States will—a message that US officials make more explicit the following week.

Four days later, Baghdad announces that it will allow arms inspectors to return “without conditions.” Iraqi and UN officials meet September 17 to discuss the logistical arrangements for the return of inspectors and announce that final arrangements will be made at a meeting scheduled for the end of the month. The United States contends that there is nothing to talk about and warns that the Iraqis are simply stalling. The Bush administration continues to press the Security Council to approve a new UN resolution calling for Iraq to give weapons inspectors unfettered access and authorizing the use of force if Iraq does not comply.

and on top of that ^ the US Air force was continually taking out antiaircraft stations that were forbidden in the ceasefire agreement...

not the second and last paragraphs