Topic: Ship of Theseus | |
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I think what I find most interesting, is to ask the question how can our knowledge of philosophical identity help us understand cultural identity. Is the relation each thing bears to itself only?... Philosophical concepts verses psychology while keeping in mind social sciences or better identity....In relation to or identical?.... If x = y does this really mean they are identical?... Could not "The Ship of Theseus" be the one exception to its' own rule?.....or was it just that someone was "under the influence"?..... |
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THIS: !! "In the realm of cognition, the special sciences are the trees, but philosophy is the soil which makes the forest possible."............. ![]() Ayn Rand..... ![]() ![]() |
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so if you rebuild an engine it's no longer the same engine?
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THIS: !! "In the realm of cognition, the special sciences are the trees, but philosophy is the soil which makes the forest possible."............. ![]() Ayn Rand..... ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
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so if you rebuild an engine it's no longer the same engine? Correct.... It is still an engine, just not the same engine.... |
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And even if they did have the same set of standards (information) would each individual process it "exactly" the same?....
No! Instead of a ship or inanimate object, lets review the same OP topic using a human being.
And in response to above quote: I think that was the point - to build up a working set of ideas on the notion of identity, without the extra garbage that comes from preconceived notions of (and attachments to) 'self'.
Yes, I think I got the point. I thought there should be two points of reference when considering the OP topic, one being subjective (human perspective) the other objective (inanimate objects). I’ll explain in further below. Linking a thing for practical purposes to a concept as identity never runs into paradox, only reference to some mysterious dualistic notion of consciousness has issues.
When we refer to objects whose existence is the product of human intervention and whose volition is not self determined, the object’s identity often stems from the concepts of purpose or function we have assigned to the object. An object, once made, can be modified in many ways and its identity may still be considered to be the same. Example: If you add a seat cushion to a four legged plain wooden chair, is it the same chair? If you cover the chair with colorful material, is it the same chair? If you semi-dismantle the pieces of the chair, modify them and reassemble them, add padding and the colorful material so that now the chair reclines and is more comfortable, is it the same chair? But what if we were talking about a human being? only reference to some mysterious dualistic notion of consciousness has issues.
If we omit ideas dealing with the mysterious, would we still find that there is a duality of body and mind, if we were to transplant the brain of one human into another? Without depending on mysticism, I think that consciousness is a dual product that develops through the dynamic and interactive features that exist between brain and body functions and body interacting with environment. Each part does make up the whole, however what parts make up personality/ identity? In effect Consciousness has two parts, the part that monitors and responds to the body’s internal workings, and the sensory input (real or perceived) of the body interacting with environment. The brain is conscious (aware) of sensory input at all times or it’s flatlined and the body soon ceases to function. This part of the brain also sends signals which tell the cognitive side of the brain that the body NEEDS something. Through cognition, the individual makes decisions about what behavior is necessary to fill these needs. The decision-making, which dictates behavior, is a cognitive function which requires interaction with the environment. What an individual learns about her body, needs, preferences and so on, stem from this interaction. Future behaviors are then based on how the brain stored and how the individual recalls those past perceptions. These perceptions are influenced by how the brain, both cognitive, and automatic, perceive the body. Thus our interaction, in this particular body, within a particular environment, become components of an individual’s identity. If you move the brain of a thirty year old, 6’2”, 195 Lb, black male, born and raised in Africa, into a 27 year old, 5’10”, 220 LB, white male, born and raised in Arizona, will it be the body that retains identity, the brain, or will we see a totally different person? We don’t need to recognize the duality that exists in a brain to know a duality exists, because we all know that no two humans are the same. But at our fundamental roots, humans are the same, it is only the duality of brain function that separates us from each other. So if the body is considered a ‘whole’ object whose parts are equivalent (at base function levels) to another human's parts, then all parts must be equally interchangeable, but in the case of brain, we hit the paradox. If that paradox exists then it exists for all objects, and replacing parts of an object does not leave us with the same object. This is just discussion and what I have deduced from the knowledge I have. I’m looking forward to learning what others think, and learning more. |
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So a person that gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person?
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So a person that gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person? Correct, the person who gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person because one piece of the whole has been replaced with a new, hopefully stronger, piece.... ![]() |
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So a person that gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person? Correct, the person who gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person because one piece of the whole has been replaced with a new, hopefully stronger, piece.... ![]() At this point, I tend to agree. However, there are two types of identity in question. In the case of a human, the change in identity may be internal only -like a heart transplant. The body knows that this is not its heart and will attack it, thus identity is changed. The other identity is superficial, what does an object look like, sound like and does it appear to function as it did before it was changed. We can be fooled by our sensory perception but in the case of living beings we know that changes to the physical, change the identity recognition of the whole. |
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Legally a person with a heart transplant is the same person.
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But legality is just a convenience. I'm not saying that a person with a heart transplant is really the same person.
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I'm not the same person today as I was yesterday ... every day.
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So a person that gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person? Correct, the person who gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person because one piece of the whole has been replaced with a new, hopefully stronger, piece.... ![]() At this point, I tend to agree. However, there are two types of identity in question. In the case of a human, the change in identity may be internal only -like a heart transplant. The body knows that this is not its heart and will attack it, thus identity is changed. The other identity is superficial, what does an object look like, sound like and does it appear to function as it did before it was changed. We can be fooled by our sensory perception but in the case of living beings we know that changes to the physical, change the identity recognition of the whole. Yes, I considered this before I answered, but his question was not up for interpretation...As it was asked, the answer I gave would be the right answer.... |
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So a person that gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person? Correct, the person who gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person because one piece of the whole has been replaced with a new, hopefully stronger, piece.... ![]() At this point, I tend to agree. However, there are two types of identity in question. In the case of a human, the change in identity may be internal only -like a heart transplant. The body knows that this is not its heart and will attack it, thus identity is changed. The other identity is superficial, what does an object look like, sound like and does it appear to function as it did before it was changed. We can be fooled by our sensory perception but in the case of living beings we know that changes to the physical, change the identity recognition of the whole. Yes, I considered this before I answered, but his question was not up for interpretation...As it was asked, the answer I gave would be the right answer.... Sorry, it wasn't my intension to quibble rather, I was thinking as I was writing so I added that we might be considering two kinds of identity. It might even be argued in other ways. That's what makes this a good topic. |
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Edited by
Bushidobillyclub
on
Mon 01/30/12 08:44 AM
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So a person that gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person? What if he has a heart grown that is identical from a genetic stand point but without the deficiency. Yes its different, but from a biological stand point it does not have the issues of rejection. It belongs . . . . the other parts recognize it . . . What does it mean to belong. Many of our examples of translating a persons brain into another are examples of putting one persons brain into another persons body, where it does not belong, where it has no reference to its prior whole. If I take an engine out of a 1984 Trans Am from the junk yard to replace in my 1984 Trans Am of the same model that engine belongs. From the stand point of identifying the whole, no part, based on characteristics of function, has changed. This was kind of what I was hinting at earlier, it all comes down to reference point. If your refer to some serial number vs function however, then the engine does not belong, becuase it may have been built a year earlier in a different lot. I think we all agree that atoms do not have identity? Nothing can distinguish one atom of oxygen from another atom of oxygen, right? So from this reduced perspective Identity disappears? Once you start to make things from the atoms, things with function, then identity becomes useful and you can mathematically represent the uniqueness of the object. The more complex the object the more challenging it becomes to mathematically represent its uniqueness. At some point only fuzzy logic seems able to deal with the representation of function at least epistemtically, I wager possible ontologically. That at least was my thought for the day! Sorry, it wasn't my intension to quibble rather, I was thinking as I was writing so I added that we might be considering two kinds of identity. It might even be argued in other ways. That's what makes this a good topic. I agree, that was why I posted it, I knew we would be all over the place with it at first and was my intention.
Legally a person with a heart transplant is the same person. I think all identity represents function, it is what is referenced that matters, and I believe paradox only occurs when the reference point shifts. Not sure I have wrapped my mind around all possible elements, and again why I thought this such a fun thought experiment. --------------------------------------------------------- I think uniqueness is a layer which only causes confusion. The teleporter paradox offers what I believe is only a paradox when you consider uniqueness as something special. Certainly in a natural environment devoid of technology capable of perfect copies uniqueness rules supreme. I would wager however that non-uniqueness does not create a paradox of identity, its just strange and not something we are used to dealing with. If you could EXACTLY copy me, every atom, every memory, every experience, EVERYTHING. It would not be me existing in two places at one time, it would be two me's existing in different places. Which at that point they would diverge into unique entities once an environmental stimulus existed for one that did not exist for the other. The same is true of data. I copy a file, I then add to the copy and not the original. |
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So a person that gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person? Correct, the person who gets a heart transplant is no longer the same person because one piece of the whole has been replaced with a new, hopefully stronger, piece.... ![]() At this point, I tend to agree. However, there are two types of identity in question. In the case of a human, the change in identity may be internal only -like a heart transplant. The body knows that this is not its heart and will attack it, thus identity is changed. The other identity is superficial, what does an object look like, sound like and does it appear to function as it did before it was changed. We can be fooled by our sensory perception but in the case of living beings we know that changes to the physical, change the identity recognition of the whole. Yes, I considered this before I answered, but his question was not up for interpretation...As it was asked, the answer I gave would be the right answer.... Sorry, it wasn't my intension to quibble rather, I was thinking as I was writing so I added that we might be considering two kinds of identity. It might even be argued in other ways. That's what makes this a good topic. ![]() ![]() ![]() |
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I am the same guy I was when I was three!!
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I think we all agree that atoms do not have identity? Nothing can distinguish one atom of oxygen from another atom of oxygen, right?
Atomic mass varies between oxygen atoms. At one particular point in time an two oxygen atoms can be differentiated by more than just atomic mass - number valence electrons / charge, total energy, velocity (translation, rotation). And yet, individual oxygen atoms can be swapped out of a molecule, and (atomic mass aside) we might have no way of knowing which was which. |
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Edited by
Bushidobillyclub
on
Mon 01/30/12 02:01 PM
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Atomic mass varies between oxygen atoms.
Salient points!
At one particular point in time an two oxygen atoms can be differentiated by more than just atomic mass - number valence electrons / charge, total energy, velocity (translation, rotation). we might have no way of knowing which was which. Right, my point. With a loss of epistemic ability to differentiate we start to loose the ability to assign identity.
I think this more than anything explains the problems with personal identity. WAAAAY to many things to consider to assign a unique identity to every possible configuration of a human, we always settle for something less. This is often the source of paradox, confusing a possible ontological state with what we can know about that ontological state. In the case of the ship of Theseus, it would be a more representative analogy if the people who repaired the craft showed up in the night when no one was looking made the repairs such that no one could know they took place at all. Perhaps we know that the ship must be getting repaired even if we do not see it, and that parts are interchanged, but the actual practical value of identity only cares that the ship is owned by Theseus, and that it functions in the same way as before the changes. |
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