Mister Chairman, Members of the Committee. It is an honor to be asked to
participate in this important review of threats to our nation and the
challenges they present to the Intelligence Community. INR has taken to
heart your admonition to describe the spectrum of threats to the United
States and its interests, and to assess the probability, immediacy, and
severity of the dangers we face, but I will do so in a way intended to
complement the judgments presented by our colleagues in other agencies
by focusing on the way threats appear when viewed through the lens of
diplomacy.

The subject of this hearing is one on which there is broad consensus in
the Intelligence Community. INR concurs with the judgment that terrorism
is the single greatest threat to Americans, both at home and abroad, and
that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles,
and certain types of advanced conventional weapons is a close and
dangerous second. We also share most of the other threat judgments
presented by our colleagues. But rather than merely echoing their
assessments, I will approach the subject reflecting INR’s unique
perspective and responsibilities as the Secretary of State’s in-house
intelligence unit.

As Secretary Rice has made clear in recent statements, diplomacy is
critical to U.S. efforts to contain, counter, and diminish the threats
we face. On February 8 she told her audience in Paris, "We agree on the
interwoven threats we face today: terrorism, and proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and regional conflicts, and failed states,
and organized crime." She added that America stands ready to work with
other countries in "building an even stronger partnership" to address
these threats.

To combat the twin scourges of terrorism and proliferation requires more
than just the effective collection of hard to obtain intelligence. At a
minimum, it also requires deep understanding of the motivations and
objectives of those who resort to terrorism and/or pursue WMD. It also
takes sophisticated analysis of all-source information, informed
judgments about what we do not know, and detailed knowledge of other
countries, cultures, political systems, and the underlying causes of
discontent and radicalization. The prerequisites for meeting all these
requirements include global coverage, deep analytical expertise, and
Intelligence Community commitment to providing policymakers what they
need, when they need it, and in a form that they can use day in and day
out.

Why are terrorism and proliferation at the top of the threat list? The
short and conventional answer is that the normalization of relations
with China and demise of the Soviet Union dramatically reduced the
danger of nuclear war and eliminated or transformed fundamentally a wide
array of associated threats. But the end of the Cold War also brought
many changes to other aspects of international life, including the
erosion of constraints on "client" states, the reemergence of long
repressed political aspirations, and the rise of ethnic and religious
hatreds. Former DCI Jim Woolsey described the change as the displacement
of a few big dragons by lots of dangerous snakes. But it was, and is,
more than that. Globalization and the information revolution have
changed expectations and aspirations and made it possible for nations
and non-state actors, including individuals, to do things that would
have been unthinkable just a few years ago.

One of the many resultant developments has been the emergence of vast
differences in coercive capabilities. This, in turn, has exacerbated the
dangers of both terrorism and proliferation. The inability of all but a
few nations to deter the most powerful countries (including but not
limited to the United States) has reinforced the determination of states
that feel threatened (whether justifiably or not) to seek asymmetric
solutions to the disparity of power. For some, this means pursuit of WMD
and delivery capabilities because they know they have no hope of
deterring or defeating the attacks they fear with conventional
armaments. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this can be found in
D.P.R.K. public statements after Operation Iraqi Freedom intended to
reassure its public and warn potential adversaries that, unlike Saddam,
it had a (nuclear) deterrent; a claim reiterated February 10. Pakistan
pursued—and obtained—nuclear weapons and delivery systems to compensate
for India’s vastly superior conventional military power and nuclear
weapons.

Terrorism is at the other end of the spectrum of asymmetric responses.
State sponsors, most notably Iran, seem implicitly to warn potential
enemies that the response to any attack will include resort to terror.
They seem to be saying, in effect, "You may be able to defeat us
militarily, but you cannot protect all your people, everywhere, all the
time." Such a porcupine defense/deterrent posture is an unfortunate but
not irrational response to wide disparities of power. The situation is
somewhat analogous for non-state actors frustrated by their inability to
achieve their (however reprehensible) goals by other means. Terror and
guerrilla warfare are long-standing measures of choice (or last resort)
for weak actors confronting a much stronger adversary. The targets vary
widely, from established democracies to authoritarian regimes. However,
in some cases, terrorists also direct their attacks against those who
are seen as responsible for—by imposition or support—the actions or
existence of the regime they oppose. That appears to be one of the
reasons al-Qaida has targeted the United States in Saudi Arabia and
terrorists in Iraq have used suicide bombers and improvised explosive
devices to attack Iraqis and others supportive of the Iraqi government.
The use of terror tactics in liberal democracies is especially
problematic because in open societies, self-restraint under the rule of
law and commitment to respect human rights and dignity complicate the
challenges of mounting an effective response.

Attacking a distant country is difficult, even in the era of
globalization, and would-be assailants must choose between difficult,
high profile attacks, like those on 9/11, and easier to accomplish but
probably lower impact incidents (like sniper attacks on random
individuals or small explosions in crowded public places). We remain
vulnerable to both types of terror attack, but arguably we are now less
vulnerable to relatively large-scale, high profile attacks than we were
before 9/11. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult to penetrate the
tight-knit groups that are most capable of carrying out such attacks on
our country and our people. We have achieved great success in disrupting
al-Qaida but may be witnessing a repeat of the pattern found in the wars
on illegal drugs and organized crime, namely, that we are fighting a
"hydra" with robust capabilities of resurgence and replacement of lost
operatives. The bottom line is that terrorism remains the most
immediate, dangerous, and difficult security challenge facing our
country and the international community and is likely to remain so for a
long time. Despite the progress we have made, it would be imprudent to
become complacent or to lower our guard.

The quest for WMD, missiles (or unmanned aerial vehicles), and advanced
conventional arms has become more attractive to, and more feasible for,
a small but significant set of state and non-state actors. This poses
major challenges to the security of the United States and our friends
and allies, but it is important to put this threat in perspective.

Nuclear Threats. The nuclear sword of Damocles that hung over our
national existence during the Cold War remains largely a concern from a
different era. Russia and China still have nuclear weapons (the number
is declining in Russia and increasing only modestly in China), but the
hostility of the past is no longer a pressing concern and neither
threatens to use them against our country. North Korea has produced
sufficient fissile material to make a small number of nuclear weapons,
but, despite its February 10 statement, there is no evidence that it has
produced such weapons and mated them to a missile capable of delivering
them to the United States. However, if it has made such weapons, it
could reach U.S. allies, our armed forces, and large concentrations of
American citizens in Northeast Asia. India and Pakistan have nuclear
weapons and the capability to deliver them to targets in the region, but
both nations are friends and neither threatens the territory of the
United States. Iran seeks but does not yet have nuclear weapons or
missiles capable of reaching the United States. INR’s net assessment of
the threat to U.S. territory posed by nuclear weapons controlled by
nation states is that it is low and lacks immediacy. But this should not
be grounds for complacency. The existence of such weapons and the means
to deliver them constitutes a latent but deadly threat. Ensuring that it
remains latent is a key diplomatic priority.

The so far theoretical possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the
hands of terrorists constitutes a very different type of threat. We have
seen no persuasive evidence that al-Qaida has obtained fissile material
or ever has had a serious and sustained program to do so. At worst, the
group possesses small amounts of radiological material that could be
used to fabricate a radiological dispersion device ("dirty bomb"). The
only practical way for non-state actors to obtain sufficient fissile
material for a nuclear weapon (as opposed to material for a so-called
dirty bomb) would be to acquire it on the black market or to steal it
from one of the current, want-to-be, or used-to-be nuclear weapons
states. The "loose nukes" problem in the former Soviet Union continues
to exist but is less acute than it once was, thanks to the Nunn-Lugar
cooperative threat reduction program and diligent efforts by Russia to
consolidate and protect stockpiles. North Korea’s possession of
weapons-grade fissile material adds a new layer of danger and
uncertainty. There is no convincing evidence that the D.P.R.K. has ever
sold, given, or even offered to transfer such material to any state or
non-state actor, but we cannot assume that it would never do so.

Chemical and Biological Weapons. Despite the diffusion of know-how and
dual-use capabilities to an ever-increasing number of countries, the
number of states with known or suspected CW programs remains both small
and stable. Most of those that possess such weapons or have the
capability to produce quantities sufficient to constitute a genuine
threat to the United States or Americans (civilian and military) outside
our borders are not hostile to us, appreciate the significance of our
nuclear and conventional arsenals, and are unlikely to transfer such
weapons or capabilities to terrorists. There are nations that might use
CW against invading troops, even American forces, on their own
territory, but we judge it highly unlikely that nation states would use
CW against the American homeland or specifically target American
citizens except as an act of desperation. Terrorists, by contrast, have
or could acquire the capability to produce small quantities of chemical
agents for use against selected targets or random individuals. We judge
the chances of their doing so as moderate to high. One or a few
disgruntled individuals or a small terrorist cell could do so in a
manner analogous to the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack on a Tokyo
subway. The severity of such an attack would be small in terms of
lethality, but the psychological and political impact would be huge.

The risk posed by nation states with biological weapons is similar to
that for CW; many nations have the capability, but few have programs and
even fewer would be tempted to use them against the United States. The
danger of acquisition and use by terrorists, however, is far greater.
Though hard to handle safely and even harder to deliver effectively, BW
agents have the potential to overwhelm response capabilities in specific
locations, induce widespread panic, and disrupt ordinary life for a
protracted period, with resulting economic and social consequences of
uncertain magnitude.

Conventional Attack. INR considers the danger of a conventional military
attack on the United States or American military, diplomatic, or
business facilities abroad to be very low for the simple reason that no
state hostile to the United States has the military capability to attack
the U.S. with any hope of avoiding massive retaliation and ultimate,
probably rapid, annihilation. The only way to reach a different
conclusion, it seems to us, is to posit an irrational actor model in
which either all key decisionmakers in a hostile country are irrational
or there are no systemic constraints on a totally irrational dictator.
We judge that such conditions exist nowhere at present and hence that
U.S. military might is, and will be, able to deter any such suicidal
adventure for the foreseeable future. Here again, ensuring that this
situation continues is a major goal of American diplomacy.

A far more dangerous threat is the possibility, even the likelihood,
that advanced conventional weapons will be obtained—and used—by
terrorists. For example, the danger that groups or individuals
antithetical to the United States will obtain MANPADs or advanced
explosives is both high and immediate. The number of Americans likely to
be killed or maimed in such an attack would be small in comparison with
the casualties in a conventional war or nuclear attack, but would be
unacceptably large no matter how small the number of casualties and
could have a major economic and psychological impact. Attacks on
American nationals, whether they are aimed at workers in an American
city, American tourists abroad, U.S. diplomatic facilities, U.S.
businesses at home or abroad, or U.S. military facilities at home or
abroad, are possible and unacceptable. The fact that State Department
personnel, family members, and facilities have been frequent targets of
attack makes us acutely aware of this danger and determined to do
everything possible to thwart it. This determination is magnified
several-fold by the fact that it is an important part of the State
Department’s mission, and the Secretary of State’s responsibility, to
protect American citizens everywhere around the globe. We take this
responsibility very seriously, and an important part of INR’s support to
diplomacy involves providing information and insights that contribute
directly to the success of this mission.

States of Concern. It has become something of a convention in threat
testimony to list a number of countries that, for one reason or another,
are judged to warrant special attention from the Intelligence Community.
A few countries on this list engage in activities that directly or
indirectly threaten American lives (e.g., North Korea’s deployment of
massive military power close enough to Seoul to put at risk our ally as
well as American troops and tens of thousands of American civilians).
Most countries on the list do not threaten the United States militarily
but are important to the success of policies to protect and promote
other American interests.

Rather than enumerate a long list of countries, I will simply provide a
series of generic examples to illustrate the kinds of conditions and
concerns germane to diplomatic efforts to protect and advance American
interests. The State Department needs good intelligence on some
countries primarily because their actions could lead to internal
instability that could, in turn, threaten other American interests.
Others belong on the list because they do not or cannot prevent the
growth and export of narcotics, harbor or assist terrorist groups, have
leaders who make anti-American pronouncements, or have conditions
conducive to the rise of extremist movements. Still others illicitly
traffic in persons, weapons, conflict diamonds, or other commodities;
control critical energy resources; or have fragile political
institutions, large and dynamic economies, or any of myriad other
attributes.

What states on this long and varied list have in common is the capacity
to affect American interests and the efficacy of U.S. foreign, economic,
and security policy. Most do not and will not "threaten" the United
States in the way that we were once threatened by the Soviet Union and
the Warsaw Pact, but something, or many things, about them pose
challenges and/or opportunities for American diplomacy. The problems of
failing states and the tremendous drain on resources in developing
countries from AIDS and other pandemics, environmental stress, and
corruption affect our ability to partner with allies and friends to meet
humanitarian needs in the interest of promoting stability and democracy.
This, in turn, poses challenges and requirements for the Intelligence
Community that extend far beyond the collection and analysis of
information germane to the suppression of terrorism and limiting the
spread of WMD, delivery systems, and advanced conventional weapons.
Meeting these challenges requires global coverage, deep expertise,
extensive collaboration, and, above all, acceptance of the idea that the
mission of the Intelligence Community demands and entails more than
collecting and interpreting covertly acquired information on a
relatively small number of narrowly defined threats. Focusing on known
threats and concerns is necessary but could prove to be very dangerous
if we are not equally vigilant in trying to anticipate unknowns and
surprises.

Intelligence is, or should be, about more than addressing "threats". The
Intelligence Community has been justifiably criticized for serious
failings and shortcomings, but we should not lose sight of what we do
well and must continue to do well. For example, America’s unrivaled
military preeminence, demonstrated so dramatically in our elimination of
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the destruction of Saddam’s regime
in Iraq, is inextricably linked to the capabilities and accomplishments
of our Intelligence Community. Intelligence collection, analytic
tradecraft, insights gained through years of experience, and close ties
among collectors, analysts, weapons designers, military planners, and
troops on the ground are all and equally critical to the military
successes we have achieved, the predominance we enjoy, and the fact that
conventional military threats to our nation and our citizens are low and
almost certain to remain so for many years. Preserving this state of
affairs will be neither automatic nor easy, but our efforts and the
allocation of resources to do so must not foreclose equally committed
efforts to address other threats and challenges.

Terrorism and proliferation are at the top of every agency’s list of
threats, and the Intelligence Community is committing substantial effort
and resources to provide the intelligence support required to contain
and reduce those dangers. In part, this requires and involves
penetration of highly restricted and suspicious organizations and secure
systems of communication, including sophisticated measures to hide
financial transactions, obscure relationships, and deceive human and
technical collectors. But collection is only one of many essential
factors in the equation. To place the intelligence we collect in
context, to distinguish between what is true and useful and what is not,
and to develop strategies to detect and disrupt activities inimical to
American interests requires expert analysts and information on a very
wide array of critical variables. Stated another way, it is not possible
to identify, anticipate, understand, and disrupt terrorists and
proliferators without broad and deep understanding of the countries,
cultures, contexts, social networks, economic systems, and political
arenas in which they spawn, develop, and operate. Without broad and deep
expertise and information that goes far beyond what we can or should
collect through clandestine means, we will not be able to judge
accurately the information we collect, and will ultimately be reduced to
reliance on lucky guesses and chance discoveries. That isn’t good
enough. We can and must do better.

When Cheney went to see the King of Saudi on Nov 25th. The Kings
pressman told the Washington posts that Saudi had threatened us and that
if we did not get Iraq under control ecp. protecting the sunni's that
they would take over and cut oil prices in 1/2. This to cripple Irans
economy as Saudi went in to clean house. Shortly after this meeting Bush
came out and said we needed more troops and Iran tried to get a peace
treaty with Saudi. What do you think we are really doing over thier?
Miles

Here is a security threat that has been all along. That so many want
to deny. why??/ ... Miles


WASHINGTON - Ex-EPA chief Christie Whitman was bombarded by boos and a
host of accusations Monday at a hearing into her assurances that it had
been safe to breathe the air around the fallen World Trade Center.

ADVERTISEMENT

The confrontation between the former head of the Environmental
Protection Agency and her critics grew heated at times. Some members of
the audience shouted in anger, only to be gaveled down by Rep. Jerrold
Nadler, D-N.Y., who chaired the hearing.

For three hours Whitman faced charges from Nadler and others that the
Environmental Protection Agency's public statements after the Sept. 11,
2001, attacks gave people a false sense of safety.

Whitman maintained the government warned those working on the toxic
debris pile to use respirators, while elsewhere in lower Manhattan the
air was safe to the general public.

"There are indeed people to blame. They are the terrorists who attacked
the United States, not the men and women at all levels of government who
worked heroically to protect and defend this country," Whitman said.

Since the attacks, independent government reviews have faulted the EPA's
handling of the immediate aftermath and the agency's long-term cleanup
program for nearby buildings.

A study of more than 20,000 people by Mount Sinai Medical Center in New
York concluded that, since the attacks, 70 percent of ground zero
workers have suffered some sort of respiratory illness. A separate study
released last month found that rescue workers and firefighters
contracted sarcoidosis, a serious lung-scarring disease, at a rate more
than five times as high as in the years before the attacks.

Nadler, a Democrat whose district includes the World Trade Center site,
called the hearing after years of criticizing federal officials for what
he says was a negligent and incomplete cleanup.

He said the Bush administration "has continued to make false, misleading
and inaccurate statements and refused to take remedial actions, even in
the face of overwhelming evidence."

Whitman called such allegations "misinformation, innuendo and outright
falsehoods."

Her responses were mostly calm and deliberate. But under questioning
from Rep. Keith Ellison, D-Minn., Whitman angrily raised her voice,
saying she based her statements on "what I was hearing from
professionals," not the whims of politicians.

Whitman pointed out that her son was in the World Trade Center complex
that day, "and I almost lost him," at which point Ellison said he would
not "stand here and allow you to try to obfuscate."

"I'm not obfuscating," Whitman shot back. "I have been called a liar
even in this room today."

She has long insisted that her statements that the "air is safe" were
aimed at those living and working near ground zero, not those who
actually toiled on the toxic pile that included asbestos.

"Was it wrong to try get the city back on its feet as quickly as
possible in the safest way possible? Absolutely not," she said, drawing
catcalls from the crowd.

Dozens of activists and Sept. 11 rescue workers came to the hearing, and
some in the audience hissed when Whitman said she felt former Mayor Rudy
Giuliani's administration "did absolutely everything in its power to do
what was right" in handling the health concerns.

Rep. Trent Franks, R-Ariz., the ranking Republican on the House
Judiciary subcommittee, said he worried that assigning blame to Whitman
could mean, in future crises, that "officials might default to silence."

The biggest security threat to our country and the rest of the world.

"So in under two weeks time, the judiciary of the United States has
established that known international terrorists, bent on causing as much
destruction within this country's borders as humanly possible, cannot be
held at Guantanamo, cannot be held in U.S. prisons, and cannot be
returned to the only countries that will accept them. Needless to say,
the media, the academy, and the Democratic Party - collapsed
institutions all - view this as a triumph."

"So if the War on Terror is a fraud, no more than a grotesque conspiracy
designed to implement some kind of garrison state, what does that make
the "terrorists"? What else but victims? Victims suffering horribly amid
the abuses of Guantanamo and the rendition prisons. Victims standing
alone against the full power of the state, victims deserving all the
assistance they can get....


And in fact, the rhetoric we're hearing from the bench today closely
echoes what was said about criminals during the 60s. Judge Diana Gribbon
Motz, in her decision on the Al-Marri case:

"To sanction such presidential authority to order the military to seize
and indefinitely detain civilians, even if the president calls them
'enemy combatants, would have disastrous consequences for the
Constitution - and the country."
There we have it - the terrorist as protector of the Constitution. The
first line of defense of the Bill of Rights. "


http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/06/casting_terrorists_as_defender.html

speaking of guatonomo cuba. I thought but maybe somebody can help me.
Hasn't Cuba been off limits to U. S. citizens for a long time? If so why
do we have a prison camp in cuba? I thought castro was our enemy, why
would he allow us a prison thier? Am I confuzed or am i missing
something. help.. Miles

Gitmo is based on a lease dating to the early 1900's. The current cuban
leadership disputes the lease based the 1969 Vienna Convention Treaty,
however since the lease accured prior to said treaty, the US argues that
it is still valid.
Cuban leadership claims it is an occupation.
As a side note, it is the oldest US military base outside the US. It has
only become popular since 2001 because of the media coverage of
prisoners from Afghanistan.

Thanks. Just wondered how we or should be thier. Thanks alot.. Miles

gitmo "victims" have it a hellubalot better than those of us living
LEGAL AND HONEST LIVES. THey even have DENTAL care. Must be nice! I have
no pity for the terrorists. We ARE at war with Iraq. We can fight em
here OR there. Lets keep it in the dunes of HELL hey?! LOL

Barb Amen...
If you read the source article I posted, one of the "victims" that they say it is "unconstitutional" to hold at Gitmo, was picked up after he killed a medic trying to save a wounded soldier. Personally they should have shot him on the battlefield, but then the media would have ranted and raved about how our soldiers kill 17 year old in war...